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INTRODUCTION
In New York, individuals who wish to bring an action
against a municipality must file a notice of claim.1 A notice of
claim serves the important function of enabling municipalities to
investigate claims against them.2 More specifically, it aids
municipalities in their ability to “locate the place, fix the time
and understand the nature of the accident” while information is
still available.3 However, it is currently unclear what exactly is
required in a notice of claim.4 Courts are split as to whether a
plaintiff must name individual municipal employees in a notice of
claim in order to maintain a subsequent action against them, or
if a notice of claim is sufficiently filed without naming individual
defendants.5 This issue carries significant consequences for
plaintiffs in municipal tort lawsuits, as failure to comply with
notice of claim requirements can result in dismissal of a
plaintiff’s claim.6

†
Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2019, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, State University of New York at
Geneseo. I would like to thank Professor Patricia Montana for her assistance and
mentorship as well as the Law Review editors and staffers for all their hard work.
1
New York State Unified Court System, Filing a Notice of Claim 1
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/6jd/forms/srforms/ntc_howto.pdf.
2
See Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080,
718 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000).
3
Id.
4
See discussion infra Part II.
5
See discussion infra Part II.
6
See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1.
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For example, in September of 2008, Jose Alvarez brought an
action against the New York Police Department (“NYPD”)
alleging that he was subjected to, among other things, false
arrest.7 In his notice of claim directed towards the City of New
York and the NYPD, he did not name any of the individual police
officers involved in the incident.8 As a result, the court dismissed
Alvarez’s claim against the officers.9 Similarly, in October of
2008, Tyrone Blake and Dwayne Johnson brought several causes
of action against the NYPD, including false arrest, and failed to
name any NYPD officers in their notice of claim.10 The court
here, in contrast to Alvarez, did not dismiss Blake and Johnson’s
action against individual officers, despite their failure to name
officers in their notice of claim.11 Thus, while failure to name
NYPD officers was of no consequence for Blake and Johnson, the
omission of individual defendants’ names was fatal to Alvarez’s
lawsuit against the employees.
In March of 2013, the Fourth Department created a
department split with the First Department on the issue of
whether individual employees must be named in a notice of
claim.12 In Goodwin v. Pretorius, the Fourth Department held
that New York General Municipal Law § 50-e does not mandate
that individual employees be named in a notice of claim.13 The
Fourth Department departed from precedent in determining that
the text and purpose of the statute compel this conclusion.14 On
the other hand, in 2006, the First Department asserted that
individual municipal employees must be named in a notice of
claim in Tannenbaum v. City of New York.15
This Note argues that the approach adopted by the Fourth
Department in Goodwin—that General Municipal Law § 50-e
does not require the naming of individual municipal employees—
is the correct approach in terms of the text of the statute and the
7

Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 599, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 362 (1st
Dep’t 2015).
8
Id. at 599–600, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362.
9
Id. at 606–07, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367.
10
Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1102–05, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 542–
44 (2d Dep’t 2017).
11
Id. at 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 545.
12
See discussion infra Part II.B.
13
Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 (4th Dep’t
2013).
14
Id. at 210–16, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 542–46.
15
Tannenbaum v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 357, 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5–6
(1st Dep’t 2006).
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purpose behind the statute, as well as policy and practical
implications. This Note is comprised of four parts. Part I
illustrates the importance of the notice of claim requirement and
introduces the text of New York General Municipal Law § 50e(2). Part II provides a synopsis of the case law on both sides of
this issue, in both New York State courts and federal courts
interpreting New York law. Part III analyzes why the Goodwin
approach is preferable to the Tannenbaum approach based on the
text of the statute, the purpose behind it, and various policy and
practical outcomes. Part IV evaluates a proposed amendment to
the statute that attempts to strike a balance between the two
views and explains why it does not efficiently solve the naming
requirement issue. For a variety of reasons, New York and
federal courts should adopt the Goodwin approach going forward.
I.
A.

THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT IN NEW YORK

The Importance of the Notice of Claim Requirement

The costs associated with personal injury lawsuits against
municipalities, particularly New York City, have serious
implications for municipalities and individual citizens.16 New
York City directs a significant amount of financial resources
towards personal injury lawsuits.17 The expenses accompanying
trial, settlement fees, and other costs of legal work are, as a
Tort lawsuits have cost
general trend, increasing.18
municipalities billions, from sidewalk slip-and-falls to highprofile incidents of police brutality.19 For example, New York
16

See infra notes 17–25 and accompanying text.
John
P.
Avlon,
Sue
City,
FORBES
(July
14,
2009),
https://www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/new-york-city-tort-tax-opinions-contributorsjohn-p-avlon.html (“New York now allocates more taxpayer dollars to settling
personal-injury lawsuits than it does to parks, transportation, homeless services or
the City University system.”).
18
See id. (“the average settlement [as of 2009] was nearly $75,000–up from
$14,396 in 1984”). But see Dan Rivoli & Reuven Blau, NYC Transit paid $431M to
settle lawsuits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/nyc-transit-paid-431m-settle-injury-lawsuits-article-1.2806066 (“the amount of
money doled out due to lawsuits dropped by 13.2% . . . [in 2015], from $99.8 million
in 2014 to $86.6 million in 2015 . . . [i]t was the first time since 2012 that the figure
dropped, records show.”).
19
Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big
U.S. Cities, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-policemisconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities-1437013834 (“The 10 cities with the largest
police departments paid out $248.7 million . . . in settlements and court judgments
in police-misconduct cases [in 2014], up 48% from $168.3 million in 2010”); Elizabeth
17
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City compensated tort victims approximately $431 million
between 2010 and 2015 solely to settle lawsuits from people
injured by Metropolitan Tranportation Authority trains or
buses.20 As a result, the cost of handling personal injury lawsuits
against a municipality falls, in some part, on the individual
taxpayer.21 Additionally, increased costs of litigation may stifle a
plaintiff’s desire to bring a tort lawsuit.22
Even acknowledging a recent decline in tort lawsuits over
the last three years,23 it is likely that tort lawsuits will continue
to have similar implications for municipalities and individuals
going forward, particularly in New York City.24 Millions of
commuters travel into and out of New York City each day,25
exposing an enormous population to the possibility of negligence.
For better or worse, tort lawsuits have an impact on both
municipalities and their local communities.26
In light of the costs associated with tort claims and the
never-ending potential for individuals to bring a tort action, it is
important to recognize the difficulties that municipalities face in
defending against these lawsuits. A notice of claim, which
supplies municipalities with the information needed to timely
assess claims against them,27 is of great importance. Without

Kolbert, Metro Matters; A Map to Suing the City, or 6,000 Pages on the Sidewalks of
New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/20/nyregion/
metro-matters-a-map-to-suing-the-city-or-6000-pages-on-the-sidewalks-of-newyork.html (“[e]very year, the city is sued for billions of dollars and winds up paying
hundreds of millions in settlements,” including sidewalk injuries); see also Avlon,
supra note 17 (“[s]idewalk ‘slip-and-falls’ cost taxpayers $54 million” in 2008).
20
Rivoli & Blau, supra note 18.
21
Lawsuit Lottery: Report Says New York’s Lawsuit Industry Costs Billions,
Distorts Justice, THE BUS. COUNCIL OF N.Y. ST., INC. (Mar. 25, 1998),
http://www.bcnys.org/whatsnew/1998/acciddrm.htm (As of 1998, municipal lawsuits
of all kinds cost New York taxpayers “$14 billion each year, or almost $800 per
person.”).
22
Joe Palazzolo, We Won’t See You in Court: The Era of Tort Lawsuits Is
Waning, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-wont-see-youin-court-the-era-of-tort-lawsuits-is-waning-1500930572 (finding that tort lawsuits
have declined because of the increasing cost of bringing lawsuits, among other
factors).
23
Id.
24
See Kolbert, supra note 19 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how all the defects noted
by Big Apple could be addressed.”).
25
See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Census Bureau Reports 1.6
Million Workers Commute into Manhattan Each Day (Mar. 5, 2013) (available at
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-r17.html).
26
See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text.
27
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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such a requirement, a municipality would struggle to promptly
discover the details of allegations against it,28 and be burdened
by potentially unlimited liability.
B. The Text of New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(2)
With these implications in mind, the way in which plaintiffs
initiate actions against government entities is a critical first step
in the process of a lawsuit.
Anyone who wishes to commence a civil lawsuit against New
York State, . . . local government (county, city, town, village) or
most government agencies for damages because of certain
alleged conduct or negligence must first file with the State or
municipal government agency a document known as a Notice of
Claim . . . .29

New York General Municipal Law § 50-e requires that a notice of
claim be filed within ninety days after a tort claim arises.30
There is a debate in New York State courts as to what must
be included in a notice of claim, and more specifically, “whether a
plaintiff is required to name individual municipal employees in a
notice of claim in order to maintain a subsequent action against
those employees.”31 New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(2)
mandates the following regarding the contents of a notice of
claim:
The notice shall be in writing, sworn to by or on behalf of the
claimant, and shall set forth: (1) the name and post-office
address of each claimant, and of his attorney, if any; (2) the
nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the place where and the
manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the items of damage or
injuries claimed to have been sustained so far as then
practicable . . . .32

Although the requirements may seem straightforward, some
courts have required that plaintiffs name individual municipal
employees in a notice of claim, while most courts have not.33
Compliance with notice of claim requirements is imperative for a
plaintiff; failure to meet the requirements typically results in

28

See discussion infra Part II.A.
New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1.
30
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018).
31
Kennedy v. Arias, No. 12 Civ. 4166 (KPF), 2017 WL 2895901, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
July 5, 2017).
32
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e.
33
See Kennedy, 2017 WL 2895901, at *12–13.
29
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dismissal of the case.34 Thus, this split in New York authority
and in federal courts interpreting New York law presents an
issue of vital importance to plaintiffs in municipal tort lawsuits.35
II. CASE LAW ADDRESSING NAMING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS IN
A NOTICE OF CLAIM
A.

When Naming of Individual Defendants Has Been Required
in a Notice of Claim

Courts that have held that individual defendants must be
named in a notice of claim have done so primarily because the
result is consistent with the overall purpose of General Municipal
Law § 50-e.36 The fundamental purpose of a notice of claim is to
provide a municipality with the ability to assess the merits of a
claim against it.37 A notice of claim featuring the names of
individual defendants allows a municipality to timely investigate
the circumstances surrounding a lawsuit before conditions
change, and while resources such as witnesses are still
available.38 Thus, an adequate notice of claim, including the
names of individual defendants, serves to limit the prejudice that
a municipality would otherwise experience through a delay in
investigation.39 Additionally, the holding has been supported
using textualist and plain meaning principles.40
1.

New York State Courts Interpreting General Municipal Law
§ 50-e(2)

Some New York courts have held that individual municipal
employees must be named in a notice of claim, and failure to
name individual defendants will lead to dismissal of an action
against them.41 White was the first New York case that
dismissed a plaintiff’s cause of action against individual
municipal employees due to a failure to name those employees in
a notice of claim.42 In that case, the court firmly rejected the
34

See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1.
See discussion infra Part II.
36
See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2.
37
See discussion infra Part III.B.
38
See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
39
See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2.
40
See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
41
See discussion infra Parts II.A.I and II.A.2.
42
See generally White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 759
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003).
35
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contention that a student’s parents could file a notice of claim
against a school district, without identifying school district
employees, and maintain a subsequent action against those
employees in their individual capacities.43
First, the court in White began by looking at the statutory
text and utilizing a “plain meaning” approach.44 Nothing in
General Municipal Law § 50-e expressly permits directing a
notice of claim at a municipality and subsequently bringing an
action against a separate entity.45 The court reasoned that
“[General Municipal Law § 50-e] certainly does not authorize
actions against individuals who have not been individually
named in a notice of claim.”46
Further, the court in White stated that the plaintiff’s
argument was “inconsistent with the notice of claim’s
acknowledged purpose of affording the public corporation the
opportunity to not only locate the defect, [and] conduct a proper
investigation, but also to assess the merits of the claim.”47
Referring to the statute’s purpose, the court emphasized that
failure to name individual employees does not provide “enough
information to enable the municipality to adequately investigate
the claim.”48 The court held that “[w]here the notice of claim fails
to . . . set forth a theory for imposing individual liability on that
employee, the municipality has no basis for investigating
whether or not the claimant has a valid claim against that
employee.”49
Moreover, despite the plaintiff’s contention that the school
district conducted a thorough investigation as a result of the
notice of claim and became aware of their employee’s actions, the
school’s actions did not excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with

43

Id. at 410, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
Id. at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
46
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
47
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (citing Carhart v. Vill. of Hamilton, 190 A.D.2d 973,
974, 594 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dep’t 1993)).
48
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644 (citations omitted). The court held it was “well
established” that any claim of liability not put forth in a notice of claim could not be
maintained in a subsequent lawsuit. Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
49
Id. at 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644. The court concluded by saying, “[t]hus,
permitting plaintiffs to prosecute causes of action against individuals who were not
named in their notice of claim is contrary both to the letter and the purpose of the
statute.” Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
44
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the notice of claim requirements.50 Ultimately, based on both the
text and purpose of the statute, the court granted the individual
defendant’s motion to dismiss.51
The first time the White approach was cited at the appellate
level was in Tannenbaum.52 In that case, the plaintiff alleged
tort and federal civil rights claims against public officers and
district attorneys.53 The Tannenbaum court affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the tort claims, which required an adequate
notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e.54
Citing to White, the court simply held that “General Municipal
Law § 50–e makes unauthorized an action against individuals
who have not been named in a notice of claim.”55 Although
Tannenbaum did not provide an extensive rationale for its
holding, it has been interpreted as an adoption of the holding in
White by the First Department. Many trial courts and the First
Department have cited to White and Tannenbaum for the
proposition that individual municipal employees must be named
in a notice of claim.56

50

Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (“The school district's efforts to investigate the
plaintiffs' claims cannot serve as a substitute for compliance with . . . General
Municipal Law § 50–e.”).
51
Id. at 413, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645–46. Moreover, “plaintiffs provide[d] no excuse
for their failure to include the individual defendants in their notice of claim . . . .”
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645–46.
52
Tannenbaum v. City of New York, 30 A.D.3d 357, 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (1st
Dep’t 2006).
53
Id. at 358–59, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5–6.
54
Id. at 358, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
55
Id., 819 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citing White, 195 Misc. 2d at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 641).
56
See Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d at 217 n.1, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 n.1 (4th
Dep’t 2013); Cleghorne v. City of New York, 99 A.D.3d 443, 446, 952 N.Y.S.2d 114,
117 (1st Dep’t 2012) (holding that the trial court should have dismissed a complaint
against two school principals entirely because the individual defendants were not
named pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e and Tannenbaum). Flowers v.
City of New York, 53 Misc. 3d 922, 933, 41 N.Y.S.3d 360 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2016)
(holding that an arrestee’s action against individual police officers must be
dismissed due to failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-e); Almas v.
P.O. Fernando Loza, No. 112379/07, 2011 WL 5118136 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 21,
2011) (citing to Tannenbaum in holding that “General Municipal Law § 50-c [sic]
makes unauthorized an action against individuals who have not been named in a
notice of claim . . . .”); Guzman v. The City of New York, No. 100314/09, 2011 WL
1360334 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing to Tannenbaum in holding that
“[t]he notice of claim must identify any City employee against which a plaintiff
intends to bring a cause of action, and the failure to do so requires dismissal of the
cause of action”); Martire v. City of New York, No. 106827/2008, 2009 WL 2350276
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. July 20, 2009) (preventing an action from proceeding against a
police officer who was not individually named in a notice of claim).
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More recently, in Alvarez v. City of New York,57 the First
Department reiterated the policies of the Tannenbaum holding,
finding the reasoning in White more persuasive than approaches
followed by the Third and Fourth Departments.58 In that case,
Alvarez brought an action against the NYPD for false arrest;
however, his notice of claim “did not specifically name any
members of the NYPD responsible for these alleged acts, nor did
they contain a generic reference to individual officers such as
‘Police Officer John Doe’ or any similar language indicating that
plaintiffs were making a claim against any police officers
individually.”59
Citing to Tannenbaum and its progeny, a
plurality authored by Justice Sweeney indicated that “[t]he
ability to ‘assess the merits of the claim’ is one of the key reasons
for the requirement of a notice of claim.”60 The court noted that
although a municipality may have adequate knowledge of the
events, the same holds true for the plaintiff, and a plaintiff’s
statutory duties should not be disregarded.61 Because more
individual defendants were added over time, as had happened in
Tannenbaum, the City was unable to launch a timely
investigation.62 This court expressed its concerns by allowing the
action to proceed:
To permit such a result raises questions of fundamental fairness
for the individual defendants, since they were not put on notice,
even in a generic way by way of “Police Officer John Doe” or
similar language, that they were going to become defendants.
Moreover, the prejudice accruing to both the municipal and
57

134 A.D.3d 599, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362 (1st Dep’t 2015).
Id. at 600–04, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362–66. The court distinguished Alvarez from
three cases cited by the dissent as inapplicable, unpersuasive precedent, or both. Id.,
22 N.Y.S.3d at 362–66. First, the court distinguished the facts of Alvarez from
Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4, as that
case concerned a “defective sidewalk and curb” and did not require the naming of
individual defendants. Second, the court distinguished Pierce v. Hickey, 129 A.D.3d
1287, 11 N.Y.S.3d 321 (3d Dep’t 2015), as the plaintiff in that case had knowledge of
the individual defendant’s name yet inexplicably omitted the name in her notice of
claim. Additionally, the court treated the Third Department’s holding as persuasive
precedent and did not feel obligated to follow Pierce. Similarly, the court did not feel
obligated to follow Goodwin, 105 A.D.3d 207, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, a case dealing with
medical malpractice. Moreover, the court noted that although service of the notice of
claim on an employee is waived by statute, failure to name an individual defendant
is not waived, as Goodwin suggested. Goodwin “did not explain how a municipality
can undertake an adequate and timely investigation . . . .”
59
Alvarez, at 599–600, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 362.
60
Id. at 604, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 366 (Sweeney, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 605, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 366.
62
Id. at 606, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367.
58
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individual defendants from such a delay is obvious, since
memories fade over time, records that could have been easily
obtained early on have been archived, lost or discarded, and
witnesses may have relocated, just to name a few of the
potential obstacles. Delay in investigation and evaluating a
claim defeats the purpose of GML § 50-e.63

Thus, the court in Alvarez adhered to the precedent set forth in
Tannenbaum.
In dissent, Justice Manzanet-Daniels suggested that the
statute’s text does not explicitly require naming individual
defendants.64 Acknowledging the reasoning from the Third and
Fourth Departments, the dissent asserted that the purpose of the
statute may be served absent the naming of individual officers.65
Moreover, the dissent implied that the defendants were in no
way hindered from investigating the claims.66 Justice ManzanetDaniels also cautioned that the court “must not be loath to depart
from precedent where it cannot be reconciled with the plain
meaning and purpose of a statute . . . [the court] ought not to
impose judicially a requirement that is nowhere to be found in
the statute.”67 One justice concurred in the opinion, conceding
that while the dissent’s argument was persuasive, he was
constrained by the precedent set forth in Tannenbaum.68

63

Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367.
Id. at 608, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 368 (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting). Justice
Manzanet-Daniels also disagreed with the plurality’s view that because service on
individual defendants is not required, naming individual defendants is not required;
one could just as easily argue that because there is no service requirement, there is
no naming requirement either. Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 368.
65
Id. at 609–10, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369–70.
66
Id. at 608–09, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369. Particularly in a case involving a false
arrest claim, “the municipal defendant is uniquely positioned to know the facts of
any such claim—at a minimum, which officers were on duty and in the vicinity.” Id.,
22 N.Y.S.3d at 369. The officers involved could likely be available to provide
information. Moreover, Justice Manzanet-Daniels questioned the plurality’s
assertion that including “John Doe” language would allow the City to gather
information about an incident of alleged false arrest. Id., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 369.
67
Id. at 610, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 370. The dissent wrote that
“Tannenbaum . . . imposed a requirement for notices of claim that went beyond those
enumerated by the General Municipal Law. The requirements for notices of claim
are in derogation of a plaintiff’s rights and must therefore be strictly construed.” Id.,
22 N.Y.S.3d at 370.
68
Id. at 607, 22 N.Y.S.3d at 367 (Mazzareli, J., concurring).
64
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Federal Courts Interpreting New York Law

In addition to New York State courts, many federal District
Courts interpreting New York Law have embraced the approach
used by the First Department.69 For example, in Rateau v. City
of New York, a plaintiff’s state law claims were dismissed after
he failed to name a New York City Department of Information
and Technology employee in his notice of claim.70 Similarly, in
Schafer v. Hicksville Union Free School Distict, the court cited to
White and Tannenbaum in holding that General Municipal Law §
50-e mandates the naming of individual defendants against
whom plaintiffs intend to commence a lawsuit.71 Several other
cases from 2011 and 2012 have held consistent with this
standard.72
Subsequently, in 2014, the Southern District of New York
once again held that suits against municipal employees in their
individual capacities must be preceded by a notice of claim
naming the defendants in order to comply with General
Municipal Law § 50-e.73 Most recently, in May of 2017, in
Johnson v. City of New York, the court held that, strictly
construing notice of claim requirements, plaintiff’s false arrest
and related claims were to be dismissed for failure to name police
department employees.74 In that case, Plaintiff did not include

69
70

See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
No. 06–CV–4751 (KAM)(CLP), 2009 WL 3148765, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,

2009).
71

No. 06–CV–2531(JS)(ARL), 2011 WL 1322903, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2011) (holding that a lawsuit against school district employees and an educational
program’s employees had to be dismissed because student’s parents failed to name
individual defendants in a notice of claim).
72
Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 217 n.1, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 n.1 (4th
Dep’t 2013). See DC v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 7:09–cv–9036 (WWE), 2011 WL
3480389, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing to White and Schafer in holding that
a plaintiff could not assert state law claims against school officials because of failure
to properly name potential defendants in a notice of claim which must be strictly
construed); see also Dilworth v. Goldberg, No. 10 Civ. 2224(RJH), 2011 WL 4526555,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding that a pro se plaintiff’s notice of claim was
insufficient because even though he did name three of the potential defendants, he
failed to assert any theories of individual liability against them); Alexander v.
Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 2d 89, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding
that a school teacher’s lawsuit against three individual school district defendants
must be dismissed for failure to name individual defendants in her notice of claim).
73
DiRuzza v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, New York, No. 14 CV 1776(VB), 2014 WL
6670101, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014).
74
No. 15–cv–8195–GHW, 2017 WL 2312924, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2017).
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“even unnamed individual ‘John Doe’ defendants.”75 Therefore,
despite the First Department standing alone as the only
appellate court in New York to currently use the approach from
White and its progeny, many federal courts have embraced the
approach originating from White as well.76
B. When Naming Individual Defendants Has Not Been
Required in a Notice of Claim
Courts that have held that naming individual defendants is
not required by General Municipal Law § 50-e have done so on
various grounds.77 First, many courts have held that, as a
textual matter, the statute does not explicitly mandate or require
the naming of individual defendants.78 Additionally, courts have
held that the purpose of the statute can be satisfied absent the
naming requirement.79 Stated otherwise, a municipality can still
adequately investigate the merits of a claim against it because of
the other requirements imposed by the statute.80 The approach
has been justified on policy grounds as well; for example, the
statute should be construed in favor of plaintiffs because the
issue concerns a derogation of a plaintiff’s common-law rights.81
1.

New York State Courts Interpreting General Municipal Law
§ 50-e(2)

Unlike the First Department, most courts deciding this issue
have held that failure to name individual municipal employees in
a notice of claim is not detrimental to a plaintiff’s action against
The controlling case from the Fourth
those employees.82
Department, Goodwin v. Pretorius, overturned Fourth
75
Id. Plaintiff in that case argued that the “failure [to name individual
defendants] should be excused because only through discovery did Plaintiff learn the
identities of the Individual Defendants. However, Plaintiff failed to provide notice of
suit against even unnamed individual ‘John Doe’ defendants, and consequently the
City of New York and the Individual Defendants were not on notice of these claims.”
Id. Curiously, the court did not cite to Goodwin, Tannenbaum, or White in its
decision.
76
For the most part, the federal cases that have decided the issue in this way
have not provided any substantive or procedural rationale beyond what has already
been outlined in the New York State courts.
77
See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
78
See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
79
See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
80
See discussion infra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2.
81
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
82
See discussion infra Parts II.B.I and II.B.2.
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Department precedent and created a department split in holding
that individual municipal employees do not have to be identified
in a notice of claim.83 The court in Goodwin sharply disagreed
with the decision of the Renssealaer County Supreme Court in
White, calling the decision “devoid of any legal authority.”84
Examining the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis, the
court nevertheless noted that “[stare decisis] does not apply to a
case where it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood
or misapplied, or where the former determination is evidently
contrary to reason.”85 Even in cases of statutory interpretation,
in which precedents are “entitled to great stability,” the court
concluded that precedent may be justifiably overruled when a
requirement has been judicially created and “goes beyond those
requirements set forth in the statute.”86 Because the statute does
not require naming individual defendants, while enumerating
other specific requirements, one must infer that naming
individual defendants was intentionally omitted from the
statute’s requirements.87
Moreover, the court in Goodwin reasoned that because the
notice of claim requirement at issue involves a “‘derogation of [a]
plaintiff’s common-law rights,’ the statute creating such a
requirement should be strictly construed in the plaintiff’s
favor.”88 Furthermore, the court looked to language from the
New York Court of Appeals in determining that “[t]he underlying
purpose of the statute may be served without requiring a plaintiff
to name the individual agents, officers, or employees in the notice
of claim.”89

83

105 A.D.3d 207, 213–16, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543–44 (4th Dep’t 2013). Goodwin
overruled Cropsey v. County Of Orleans Industrial Development Agency. Cropsey v.
Cty. Of Orleans Indus. Dev. Agency, 66 A.D.3d 1361, 886 N.Y.S.2d 290 (4th Dep’t
2013).
84
Goodwin, 105 A.D.3d at 211, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
85
Id. at 215, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (quoting Kash v. Jewish Home & Infirmary of
Rochester, N.Y., Inc., 61 A.D.3d 146, 150, 873 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep’t 2009)). The
court further stated that “in such cases it is the duty of the courts to re-examine the
question.” Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
86
Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
87
See id. at 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
88
Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (quoting Sandak v. Tuxedo Union Sch. Dist. No. 3,
Town of Tuxedo, 308 N.Y. 226, 230, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954)).
89
Id., 962 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (citing Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389,
393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000)).
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Subsequently, the Third Department in Pierce v. Hickey
followed Goodwin in holding that a motorist was not required to
name a county machine equipment operator in order to maintain
a subsequent action against him.90 The court in Pierce held that
General Municipal Law § 50-e simply does not require that an
individual employee be named in a plaintiff’s notice of claim.91
Dismissal of the complaint was not warranted because, as
annunciated in Goodwin, the purpose of the statute can be
satisfied absent naming individual defendants.92
Additionally, in the recent case of Blake v. City of New York,
the Second Department agreed with the Third and Fourth
Departments after recognizing a split in authority.93 After an
analysis of cases including Alvarez, Goodwin, and Pierce, the
court simply concluded that “[l]isting the names of the
individuals who allegedly committed the wrongdoing is not
required [by the statute].”94 Most recently, in Williams v. City of
New York, the Second Department cited to Blake as applicable
precedent after acknowledging a split in authority.95 Thus, a
majority of the New York appellate authority, the Second, Third,
and Fourth Departments, agree that naming municipal
employees is not required in a notice of claim to maintain a
subsequent action against the individuals as defendants.
2.

Federal Courts Interpreting New York Law

Many federal district courts have agreed with the
interpretation of General Municipal Law § 50-e adopted by the
Second, Third, and Fourth Departments.96 For example, in
Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, the Southern District of
New York adopted “the Goodwin Court’s well-reasoned
conclusion that there is no requirement that individual
defendants be specifically named in the notice of claim.”97 In that
case, the estate of a deceased individual brought an action as a

90

Pierce v. Hickey, 129 A.D.3d 1287, 1288–89, 11 N.Y.S.3d 321, 322–23 (3d
Dep’t 2015).
91
Id., 11 N.Y.S.3d at 322–23.
92
Id. at 1289, 11 N.Y.S.3d at 323.
93
Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1105–06, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 544–
45 (2d Dep’t 2017).
94
Id. at 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 545.
95
Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1305, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401, 406
(2d Dep’t 2017).
96
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
97
986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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result of a fatal injury during a police encounter, yet did not
name individual police officers in a notice of claim.98 Since the
notice of claim allowed the City to conduct an adequate
investigation by describing “the specific, date, time, and address
of the incident,” as well as the alleged facts, “[i]t would then have
been a straightforward inquiry for the City to determine which
individuals had been dispatched . . . .”99
Referring to the
extensive rationale behind Goodwin, the notice of claim allowed
the City to conduct a thorough investigation; thus, the court
concluded the plaintiff’s estate should not be penalized pursuant
to General Municipal Law § 50-e.100 Similarly, in Reyes v. City of
New York, the Southern District of New York predicted that the
New York Court of Appeals would follow Goodwin based on the
court’s analysis in Chamberlain.101
Federal courts in 2018 have continued to wrestle with this
issue.102 As a general trend, federal cases decided after Goodwin
have most commonly found that failure to name individual
defendants in a notice of claim does not warrant dismissal of a
plaintiff’s action.103 For example, in the recent case of Russell,104
the Southern District held that failure to name individual
defendants did not constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal of a
plaintiff’s action.105 In December of 2017 and March of 2018, the
Southern District of New York continued to embrace the
approach from cases such as Goodwin and Pierce, determining
98

Id. at 373–78, 396.
Id. at 397.
100
Id.
101
992 F. Supp. 2d 290, 301–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
102
See Kennedy v. Arias, No. 12 Civ. 4166 (KPF), 2017 WL 2895901, at *12–13
(S.D.N.Y. July 05, 2017) (recognizing a split in New York appellate authority and
Federal Court rulings, yet “refrain[ing] from entering the fray given that Plaintiff’s
state-law claims for assault and battery fail on separate grounds”).
103
See Matthews v. City of New York, No. 15–CV–2311 (ALC), 2016 WL
5793414, n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016); see also Kennedy v. City of Albany, No. 15–
CV–009491(MAD), 2015 WL 6394513, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015) (estimating
that the Court of Appeals would find that “individually named officers are not
required in the notice of claim . . . where the language of the statute does not require
it” and the purpose of the statute can be served absent the requirement); see also
Bah v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 6690(PKC)(KNF), 2014 WL 1760063, at *9–12
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014) (agreeing with Chamberlain and Reyes in determining that
the Court of Appeals would likely adopt Goodwin, and holding that a notice of claim
“contained sufficient detail to allow the City to investigate the claim and ascertain
the identities of John Doe officers”).
104
Russell v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., No. 16–CV–1712(KMK), 2017 WL
4326545, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017).
105
Id.
99
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that the New York Court of Appeals would be unlikely to adopt
the requirement promulgated by the First Department.106 Thus,
although many federal cases have held to the contrary, the
greater weight of the more recent federal cases interpreting New
York law aligns with the Second, Third, and Fourth
Departments.
III. NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT THE GOODWIN APPROACH
The approach adopted by the Second, Third, and Fourth
Departments is not only preferable to the First Department’s
approach, but also brings about a preferable outcome on various
grounds. First, the Goodwin approach is a proper reading of the
text of General Municipal Law § 50-e as a matter of statutory
interpretation. Second, the purpose of the statute can be fulfilled
absent the naming of individual defendants. Third, the Goodwin
approach promotes desirable policy outcomes, namely fairness
and protection of a plaintiff’s rights. Lastly, the Goodwin
approach results in better practical implications for New York’s
notice of claim requirements. Although there are certainly valid
arguments in favor of the Tannenbaum approach, the Goodwin
reading of General Municipal Law § 50-e is, overall, the approach
that should be adopted by New York and federal courts going
forward.

106

See Garcia v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 11-CV-7258 (KMK), 2017 WL 5633163,
at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017) (holding that “[i]n light of the fact that three out of
the four New York appellate departments have declined to require plaintiffs to
specifically name each individual defendant as a respondent in the notice of claim,
and in light of the New York Court of Appeals' directive that ‘[t]he test of the
sufficiency of a [n]otice of [c]laim is merely whether it includes information sufficient
to enable the city to investigate’ and that ‘[n]othing more may be required,’ . . . the
Court concludes that the requirement imposed by the First Department to
specifically name each individual defendant as a respondent in the notice of claim is
unlikely to be adopted by the New York Court of Appeals”). The court in Garcia also
noted with regards to that case that the “notice of claim made clear that it was
Officer Hess who fired into the windshield of Henry's vehicle, and there can be little
question that the Village of Pleasantville had ample notice of the need to investigate
the conduct of Officer Hess.” Id.; see also Joseph v. Deluna, No. 15-CV-5602 (KMW),
2018 WL 147398, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2018).
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Interpreting the Text of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2): the
Goodwin Approach is the Correct Reading

When trying to discern the meaning of a statute, the first
place to start is the text of the statute itself.107 One would surely
look to the text of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2), entitled
“Form of notice; contents,” in determining what must be included
in a notice of claim.108 As mentioned in Part I, the section
enumerates four requirements: “(1) the name . . . of each
claimant . . . ; (2) the nature of the claim; (3) the time when, the
place where and the manner in which the claim arose; and (4) the
items of damage or injuries claimed to have been
sustained . . . .”109
Many courts have accepted the proposition that the text of
the statute simply does not require the naming of individual
defendants, and therefore a plaintiff’s claim is not necessarily
insufficient merely because individual defendants were not
named.110 After reading the statute, it would seem apparent that
these courts, which have embraced the Goodwin approach, are
correct. The statute does not require the naming of individual
defendants on its face. Stated otherwise, nothing in General
Municipal Law § 50-e compels a plaintiff to name individual
municipal employees in a notice of claim.
While White,
Tannenbaum and other courts have read this requirement into
the statute, it is simply absent from the statute’s text.
Moreover, not only does the statute omit language regarding
the naming of individual defendants, if taken in conjunction with
the fact that the statute contains other requirements, a powerful
inference can be drawn. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New
York Annotated Statutes § 240 reads, “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is applied in the construction of
statutes . . . where a law expressly describes a particular act,
thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference
must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended
to be omitted or excluded.”111 In other words, if the legislature
mentions items A, B, and C of a particular category, it may be
107

The Writing Center at Georgetown University Law Center, A Guide to
Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes (2017), http://kacca.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/03/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes.pdf.
108
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018).
109
Id.
110
See discussion supra Part II.B.
111
N.Y. STATUTES LAW § 240 (McKinney 2018).
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inferred that the legislature did not intend to include related
items D, E, and F.112 Numerous cases in New York State courts
have cited to § 240 in interpreting the meaning of legal text.113
Indeed, Goodwin addressed this reasoning in one sentence citing
to a New York Court of Appeals case that quoted § 240.114
Expressio unius is a canon of negative implication: “[w]ords
omitted may be just as significant as words set forth.”115 This
principle of interpretation is intuitive and generally describes
how people, as well as lawmakers, convey ideas.116 Applied to
General Municipal Law § 50-e, there is a strong inference to be
drawn that the New York legislature did not intend to include
the naming of individual defendants in a notice of claim. If the
New York legislature wanted the names of individual municipal
employees to be included in the statute, they likely would have
included such a requirement alongside the other enumerated
requirements.
The expressio unius canon is not without its limitations, as
well as some healthy criticism. For example, this principle is
heavily dependent on context, and applies when the category
being specified “can reasonably be thought to be an expression of
all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved.”117 Moreover,
the principle has been criticized as unreliable for relying on a
false assumption that the legislature considered all possible
items to be included; legislators and others may not think in such
precise terms when drafting statutory language.118
112

See id.
See id.; see, e.g., Buholtz v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 1071, 319
N.Y.S.2d 202 (3d Dep’t 1971) (contemplating whether Section 27 of the
Transportation Corporations Law implied that telephone companies were restricted
from installing underground lines under private property without an owner’s
consent, because the statute permits the installation of lines under public land yet
excludes such language when referring to private property).
114
Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 216, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545–46 (4th
Dep’t 2013) (“It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that, where as here
the statute describes the particular situations in which it is to apply, an irrefutable
inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be
omitted or excluded”) (citing Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of
New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208–209, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
115
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 668–69 (5th ed.
2014); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (2012).
116
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 115, at 107–08.
117
See id., at 107 (emphasis in original).
118
See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 115, at 669.
113
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Despite the limitations surrounding expressio unius, the
canon should still be applied when interpreting General
Municipal Law § 50-e(2). “The more specific the enumeration,
the greater the force of the canon . . . .”119 In other words, the
more detail that is specified in the statute, the more powerful the
inference that what is omitted was intended to be left out. Here,
§ 50-e(2) requires a claimant’s name, the nature of the claim, the
time, place, and manner in which the claim arose, as well as the
injuries suffered.120 One can assume that if the statute mandates
the inclusion of the claimant’s name, the defendant’s name, if
required, would have been included as well. Further, the nature,
time, place, and manner of the claim are indicative of a
sophisticated level of detail.
This specific level of detail
strengthens the notion that defendants’ names were intentionally
excluded. For example, if the statute merely required “the
claimant’s name and the details giving rise to the claim,” the
argument that naming individual defendants is required would
be more persuasive because that language would suggest that
the legislature did not intend to create an exhaustive list. That
is not the case here, as the statute enumerates several
requirements. Although utilizing this principle does not provide
iron-clad proof as to legislative intent, it is a helpful tool in
interpreting the language of the statute.
Moreover, the White court’s interpretation of the statute—
the origin of the Tannenbaum approach—is unavailing despite
claiming to utilize a “plain meaning” approach.121 After stating
that the statute contains no provision permitting actions against
individuals not named in a notice of claim,122 the court rejected
the argument that an action could be brought against school
district officials not named in a notice of claim.123 This reasoning
is conclusory and inaccurate. The court in White erroneously
assumed that because the statute does not expressly authorize a
course of action, that course of action must violate the statute.

119

See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 115, at 108.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018).
121
White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d
641, 644 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003).
122
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
123
See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.
120
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The court in White reasoned further that while the statute
indicates that service of the notice of claim is not required upon
individual employees,124 no such exception is made for naming
individual employees.125 However, one could just as easily argue
the opposite conclusion. Perhaps the statute “dispenses with
service on individual actors because the statute does not require
that they be named in the notice of claim.”126 Further, the
exception that service is not required must be read pursuant to
the sentence that immediately follows it, the only other sentence
in subsection § 50-e(1)(b). That sentence requires service if the
municipality has an obligation to indemnify such person.127 The
provision indicating service is not required was articulated to
distinguish typical cases from the instances in which a
municipality has an obligation to indemnify a defendant. Thus, a
structuralist argument that because the statute excuses service,
it should excuse naming of defendants as well is unpersuasive.
From a textualist perspective, the statute does not contain a
requirement that individual defendants must be named.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate for judges to read in a
requirement that is not included in the plain language of the
text. This is especially true when the statute enumerates other
specific requirements aside from the naming of defendants. If
the legislature wants to amend the statute, they are at liberty to
do so. However, absent such an amendment of the statute,
General Municipal Law § 50-e should not be read to include such
a requirement.
B. The Goodwin Approach is Consistent with the Purpose of
General Municipal Law § 50-e(2)
In addition to the text of General Municipal Law § 50-e, it is
helpful to look at the purpose of the statute in evaluating
whether naming individual municipal defendants is required.
124

N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (“Service of the notice of claim upon an officer,
appointee or employee of a public corporation shall not be a condition precedent to
the commencement of an action or special proceeding against such person. If an
action or special proceeding is commenced against such person, but not against the
public corporation, service of the notice of claim upon the public corporation shall be
required only if the corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify such person
under this chapter or any other provision of law.”).
125
White, 195 Misc. 2d at 411, 759 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
126
Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 608, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 368 (1st
Dep’t 2015) (Manzanet-Daniels, J., dissenting).
127
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e.
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Both sides of the debate have cited to a common purpose of the
statute, but have arrived at different conclusions in individual
cases.128
The purpose of the statute requiring persons seeking to recover
in tort against a municipality to serve a notice of claim on the
municipality as a precondition to suit is to enable the
authorities to investigate, collect evidence and evaluate the
merit of a claim while the information is still available and
before witnesses depart or conditions change.129

When looking to the purpose of New York’s notice of claim
requirements, one of the leading cases cited to is Brown v. City of
New York.130 In that case, concerning a defective sidewalk and
curb, the Court of Appeals explained that the notice of claim
requirement exists “[t]o enable authorities to investigate, collect
evidence, and evaluate the merit of a claim . . . .”131 Many courts
on both sides of the debate have agreed with this acknowledged
Regarding notice of claim
purpose of the statute.132
requirements, the Court of Appeals said the following after
quoting the language of General Municipal Law § 50-e(2):
Reasonably read, the statute does not require ‘those things to be
stated with literal nicety or exactness’ . . . [t]he test of the
sufficiency of a Notice of Claim is merely ‘whether it includes
information
sufficient
to
enable
the
city
to
investigate’ . . . ‘[n]othing more may be required’ . . . in
determining compliance with the requirements of General
Municipal Law § 50-e, courts should focus on the purpose served

128

See discussion supra Part II.
62A N.Y. JUR. 2D Government Tort Liability § 382 (2018).
The plain purpose of statutes requiring pre-litigation notice to
municipalities is to guard them against imposition by requiring notice of
the circumstances upon which a claim for damages is made, so that its
authorities may be in a position to investigate the facts as to time and
place, and decide whether the case is one for settlement or litigation. Thus,
the requirement furthers the public policy of preventing needless litigation
and saving unnecessary expenses by affording an opportunity amicably to
adjust claims against public corporations before litigation is commenced.

129

Id.
130

95 N.Y.2d 389, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4 (2000). Brown has been
cited by many of the cases discussed herein, including Alvarez and Goodwin. See,
e.g., supra notes 58 and 89.
131
Brown, 95 N.Y.2d at 392, 740 N.E.2d at 1079, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
132
See discussion supra Part II.
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by a Notice of Claim: whether based on the claimant’s
description municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the
time and understand the nature of the accident . . . .133

Thus, the Court of Appeals has not only defined the purpose of
the statute but spoke directly to the requirements concerning the
contents of a notice of claim.134
Based on this standard, the purpose of the statute can still
be fulfilled under the Goodwin approach. Even without the
naming of individual defendants, the municipality can
adequately investigate the claim pursuant to the statute’s other
requirements. For example, in an action against a police
department and individual police officers, a common suit brought
against a municipality, a police department should be able to
uncover, through an investigation, which officers are being sued
in their individual capacities.135 A police department can likely
determine, based on the time, place, and manner in which the
claim arose, which officers could be potentially involved in the
claim.136 Similarly, in a case against a school district and school
employees, the school district can likely ascertain, based on the
information in the notice of claim, details behind their employees’
alleged negligence.137 Given the other specific notice of claim
requirements, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which failure
to name individual defendants would leave a municipality
completely in the dark with regards to the claim giving rise to
the cause of action. Additionally, “the purpose of the notice of
133

Brown, 95 N.Y.2d at 393, 740 N.E.2d at 1080, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (emphasis

added).
134

See id.; see also Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d
397, 398 (1952) (“The prime, if not the sole, objective of the notice of claim
requirements of such a statute is to assure the city an adequate opportunity to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of
the claim while information is still readily available.”).
135
See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
136
See id.
137
White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d
641, 645 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003). (“[D]uring the school district’s thorough
investigation, which continued for months and consisted of numerous witness
interviews, the school district learned of the negligence of its employees and hence
none of those employees who are named as defendants in this action can claim that
they would be prejudiced by not receiving a notice of claim against them within 90
days of the accrual of the plaintiffs’ claim . . . .”). Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Despite acknowledging this, the court in White still
concluded that “[t]he school district’s efforts to investigate the plaintiffs’ claims
cannot serve as a substitute for compliance with . . . General Municipal Law § 50-e.”
Id., 759 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
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claim requirement is to notify the municipality, not the
individual defendants.”138 Since the purpose behind the law is to
enable the municipality to investigate, and nothing more may be
required,139 it does not follow that the individual employees must
be put on notice as well.
Moreover, the argument from some courts such as Alvarez,
that naming “John Doe” defendants would constitute a sufficient
notice of claim140 undermines the argument behind the
Tannenbaum approach. The court in Alvarez suggested that
including “Police Officer John Doe” would put the municipality
on notice and satisfy the statute’s notice requirements.141
However, to hold that individual defendants must be named, yet
indicate that “John Doe” language may suffice, is contradictory.
The inclusion of “John Doe” language provides barely any
additional information for a municipality to utilize in an
investigation.
For example, in a claim against a police
department, “John Doe language will not enable the municipality
to better identify the arresting officers in the unlikely event the
City is unaware of their identities.”142 Receiving the time, place,
and manner of the claim places the municipal organization which
employs these individuals in a better position, relative to the
plaintiff, to discover their identities.143 Thus, to assert that the
inclusion of “John Doe” language would ultimately allow a
plaintiff’s claim to proceed, when it would otherwise be
dismissed, defies common sense.
Although the municipality may experience some form of
prejudice from a plaintiff not naming individual defendants in
their notice of claim,144 it is not so significant as to warrant a “door-die” requirement on the plaintiff’s part. While it is true that
138
Blake v. City of New York, 148 A.D.3d 1101, 1106, 51 N.Y.S.3d 540, 545 (2d
Dep’t 2017) (citing Zwecker v. Clinch, 279 A.D.2d 572, 573, 720 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d
Dep’t 2001)).
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Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718
N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000); see also Rivero v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 204, 208, 48
N.E.2d 486, 488 (1943) (holding that a notice of claim, which described the exact
location of alleged negligence on a public road, “was sufficient to enable the city to
investigate the claim of negligence and nothing more was required”) (emphasis
added).
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See, e.g., supra notes 59, 63, 75 and accompanying text
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Alvarez v. City of New York, 134 A.D.3d 599, 605, 22 N.Y.S.3d 362, 366 (1st
Dep’t 2015).
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quotation marks omitted).
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memories may fade and information may be more difficult to
obtain, such is true of any prolonged litigation, and the
municipality possesses the tools at hand to prevent any delay in
investigation.145 What matters is not that a plaintiff file a notice
of claim with “literal . . . exactness,” but rather whether
“municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time and
understand the nature of the accident,”146 which can be satisfied
absent the naming of particular employees. This is not to say
that a plaintiff can bring a suit based on a different theory of
liability than that alleged in the notice of claim; however, an
adequate notice of claim will allow a municipality to sufficiently
investigate a claim and determine whether to settle or proceed
with litigation.
C. The Goodwin Approach Results in Superior Policy Outcomes
when Compared to the Tannenbaum Approach
Somewhat overlapping with the purpose behind the statute,
the Goodwin approach is also preferable to the Tannenbaum
approach as a matter of policy outcomes. Primarily, the Goodwin
approach promotes fairness for an individual plaintiff, allowing
meritorious claims to proceed. It would be unjust for a claim to
be dismissed simply because of a formality, when the notice of
claim otherwise complies with General Municipal Law § 50-e.
This is especially because, in some instances, it may be
impractical for plaintiffs to discover the identities of employees
within the ninety-day period.147 A plaintiff who provides enough
context and details for the investigatory process to proceed
should not be punished by having his entire claim dismissed for
lack of compliance.
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See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2018). The tools at hand being
the time, place, and manner in which the claim arose, as well as the nature of the
claim.
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Brown v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 389. 393, 740 N.E.2d 1078, 1080, 718
N.Y.S.2d 4, 6 (2000).
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Goodwin v. Pretorius, 105 A.D.3d 207, 214, 962 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544 (4th Dep’t
2013) (quoting Schiavone v. County of Nassau, 51 A.D.2d 980, 981, 380 N.Y.S.2d 711
(2d Dep’t 1976), aff’d, 41 N.Y.2d 844, 362 N.E.2d 252, 393 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977)) (“[o]n
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In the 1970s, the New York legislature amended § 50-e “[in
response to judicial criticism by] . . . mitigating the harshness of
some of its more stringent provisions.”148 Previously, the Court of
Appeals highlighted the inequities associated with strict
enforcement of § 50-e.149 Judge Breitel called for “prompt
legislative correction of the statute.”150 Rather than serving its
intended function, strict reading of service requirements created
“a trap to catch the unwary or the ignorant.”151 Thus, the law
should serve not to punish unwary plaintiffs who may lack
expertise in these matters, but to “avoid obvious abuses.”152
Stated otherwise, the Goodwin approach should prevail
because this issue implicates a plaintiff’s right to bring a lawsuit.
“General Municipal Law § 50-e was not meant as a sword to cut
down honest claims, but merely as a shield to protect
municipalities against spurious ones.”153 Thus, the statute was
enacted not to strike down lawsuits that are otherwise valid, but
to protect from frivolous claims and nuisance suits. Accordingly,
a plaintiff who adequately describes the time, place, and manner
of an event presumably has a good-faith claim and deserves their
day in court. Similarly, as mentioned in Goodwin, statutes
involving a “derogation of [a] plaintiff’s common law rights” are
to be strictly construed in the plaintiff’s favor.154 This principle,

148
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51 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 222, 222 (1976).
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See id. at n.105. (“[T]he Court of Appeals, in Teresta v. City of New
York . . . acknowledged the inequities which can result from a literal enforcement of
§ 50-e. In Teresta, the Court deemed the City to have waived the notice of claim
requirement when it had examined the plaintiff for his alleged injuries and yet
failed to object to lack of notice until the eve of trial.”).
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103, 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9, 16 (1972)) (“Except to the practitioner who is skilled in tort
cases or claims against municipalities, it is a mousetrap. Such a statute should
provide a greater discretion to give relief from its requirements and, of course, to
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discretion . . . .”).
151
Id. (quoting Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397,
398 (1952)).
152
Id. (quoting Murray, 30 N.Y.2d at 121, 282 N.E.2d at 108, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
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originating in English common law and adopted in state court
jurisdictions, can be used, as it was in Goodwin, to promote
fairness to plaintiffs.155
However, this all must be balanced against affording
fairness to municipalities who need sufficient information and
time to investigate claims. A notice of claim must ensure that a
municipality can satisfactorily investigate without facing unfair
prejudice that may accrue due to the passage of time.156
However, concerns over whether a notice of claim without
individual employees named would be fair to the city are
baseless. It is unlikely that a city would be unable to conduct a
prompt investigation after knowing the nature of the claim as
well as the time, place, and manner in which the events
unfolded.157 Likewise, it would be difficult for plaintiffs to bring
nuisance suits or frivolous lawsuits when there are still several
specific requirements needed for an adequate notice of claim.
Therefore, the Goodwin approach strikes the proper balance by
affording fairness to plaintiffs, whose rights need protection,
rather than the municipality, who can likely investigate the
claim irrespective of whether individuals are named.
D. The Goodwin Approach is Preferable Based on the Practical
Implications of the Two Approaches
A final way to assess the impact of the Goodwin approach
compared to the Tannenbaum approach is to predict the likely
practical results stemming from each option. For example, the
Goodwin approach would permit more cases to go forward as
cases that otherwise would have been dismissed under the
Tannenbaum approach would proceed. However, it is unlikely
that this increase of cases will negatively burden the court
system. Tort lawsuits against municipalities are only one type of
suit, and, in fact, have declined over the last three years for
various reasons.158 Thus, the Goodwin approach does not open
the floodgates to a host of new litigation, but rather allows a
subset of meritorious lawsuits that otherwise would have been
155

See generally R. Perry Sentell Jr., Statutes in Derogation of the Common
Law: In the Georgia Supreme Court, 53 MERCER L. REV. 41 (2001).
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See 62A N.Y. JUR. 2D Government Tort Liability § 382 (2018).
157
See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); White v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 195 Misc. 2d 409, 412, 759 N.Y.S.2d
641, 645 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer Cty. 2003).
158
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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dismissed to proceed. Additionally, it is unlikely that frivolous or
nuisance lawsuits will persist because the plaintiff still must
describe the time, place, and other requirements regarding how
the claim arose.159
Another practical effect is that the Goodwin approach may
promote more cooperation between the municipality and the
plaintiff. Under the Tannenbaum approach, a municipality may
be reluctant to ask a plaintiff for additional information
supplementing his or her notice of claim. For instance, if a
plaintiff fails to name individual employees, a municipality is
incentivized to not make plaintiffs aware of this error, as his
claims against municipal employees would be destined for
dismissal. On the other hand, the Goodwin approach may
incentivize municipalities to communicate with plaintiffs. Since
the plaintiff’s claim against individual employees will proceed
irrespective of whether individual employees are named in a
notice of claim, municipalities are less discouraged from asking
plaintiffs to assist in identifying individual defendants if needed
for an investigation.
One negative implication associated with the Tannenbaum
approach is that it might encourage excessive naming on the
plaintiff’s part. A plaintiff may not be able to ascertain the
When unsure about
names of the alleged tortfeasors.160
employees’ identities, a plaintiff may err on the side of caution
and name every police officer, for example, that he can discover
through the internet and other sources. Such an action would
place a burden on the municipality, namely, the municipality
would have to use resources not otherwise expended in sorting
through excessive naming. This would cause confusion at the
outset of the investigatory process.
Alternatively, one may question whether one approach has
any advantageous practical effects over the other approach at all,
in a typical case. Under the Goodwin approach, plaintiffs do not
have to worry about naming individual defendants, yet the
plaintiffs who easily can will likely name them regardless. Also,
in most cases, whether the defendants are named or not, a
municipality will be able to discern enough information about the
event because of the requirements that General Municipal Law §
50-e directly imposes. However, in many cases, the practical
159
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outcome—whether a case will be dismissed or not—is of vital
importance.161 Thus, the practical effects stemming from the
Goodwin approach are also beneficial.
IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT DOES NOT EFFICIENTLY SOLVE
THE NAMING ISSUE
A.

Pending Legislation: An Attempt to Compromise the Two
Views

In 2017, New York State Senator Kathleen A. Marchione
introduced a bill addressing the exact notice of claim naming
issue that resulted in the split of authority between the First
Department and the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments
outlined in Part II.162 Entitled “Relates to services of certain
notices of claim,” the bill addresses both a service issue and the
relevant naming issue.163 The bill proposes to add the following
language to New York General Municipal Law § 50-e(1)(b)
regarding the naming issue:
If an action or special proceeding is commenced against such
person and against the public corporation itself, the notice of
claim need not identify the person by name unless: (1) the
plaintiff knew or with due diligence could have discovered the
person’s name within the time allotted for service of the notice
of claim; and, (2) the failure to identify the person by name
prejudiced the public corporation in its investigation of the
claim. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the claimant’s
rights as against the public corporation.164

Thus, the amendment would create a default in which a
defendant’s name is not required. However, naming would be
required both when naming is reasonably possible and the
municipality would be prejudiced without doing so. Specifically,
the amendment assesses whether “the plaintiff knew or with due
diligence could have discovered” the municipal employee’s

161

See New York State Unified Court System, supra note 1.
2017 N.Y. S.B. 5097, 240th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). The bill was introduced
into the Committee on Senate Local Government on March 8, 2017. After going
through several readings and passing the committee stage, it was placed on the
senate floor calendar on March 27, 2017. After the bill advanced to the Committee
on Senate Rules on June 21, 2017, the bill was later referred back to the Committee
on Senate Local Government on January 3, 2018, failing to advance further.
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name.165 If satisfied, and the municipality can show that it was
prejudiced in its investigation, the naming requirement will be
imposed.
In the Committee Report accompanying the bill, Senator
Marchione explained her rationale behind the amendment,
calling it a “compromise” between the Tannenbaum approach
and the Goodwin approach.166 The Committee Report claims that
the amendment “strikes a sensible and fair balance between
competing concerns, and . . . it recognizes that the public
corporation is best situated to show that it was prejudiced (as
opposed to the plaintiff having to prove the negative).”167
B. The Proposed Amendment Does Not Efficiently Solve the
Naming Issue
While the amendment seems to directly address the problem
it does so superficially and in fact raises more issues and creates
inefficiencies.
Most notably, Senator Marchione’s proposed
amendment suffers from many of the same deficiencies as the
Tannenbaum approach. For example, examining the purpose
behind a notice of claim, a municipality has the tools to
adequately investigate a claim against it without any naming
requirement.168 Similarly, a notice of claim should not serve to
punish plaintiffs who fail to list names when they otherwise
provide information that would allow a municipality to
investigate a claim against it.169 The amendment would also lead
to undesirable practical outcomes, such as a lack of cooperation
between the parties and excessive naming on the part of the
plaintiff.170
Additionally, Senator Marchione’s proposed amendment
over-complicates the issue by essentially creating a de facto
naming requirement for the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff will be
charged with anything he could have discovered, it places
responsibility on the plaintiff to exercise due diligence in naming.
While the amendment is framed such that naming is not
required unless the elements are met, it practically becomes a
requirement for plaintiffs to name the employees or exhaust all
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id.
S. 239-5097, 2017-2018 Regular Sessions (N.Y. 2017).
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
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reasonable possibilities looking for their names in order to avoid
the threat of dismissal. Moreover, there is an additional burden
on the municipality who now must produce evidence of the
prejudice that it experienced. Showing whether a plaintiff has
knowledge or exercised due diligence, and whether a
municipality was prejudiced, would lead to a trial within a trial.
Similarly, Senator Marchione’s proposed amendment is
inefficient and creates several problems that will result in
additional litigation. First, the amendment would require courts
to dive into the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge or what the
plaintiff could have discovered with due diligence.171 While
knowledge may be clear in some instances, this unsettling
proposition would lead to additional disputes as to what
constitutes due diligence under the circumstances and whether a
plaintiff could have discovered the defendant’s names.
Moreover, forcing the municipality to show whether it has
been prejudiced is equally problematic. For example, there are
open questions about the extent of prejudice a municipality
would need to allege in order to force a plaintiff to name
defendants. Thus, the bill raises more questions than it answers.
While the amendment attempts to strike a balance between
the two approaches, it would lead to complicated results and is
not an efficient way to solve this issue. The Goodwin approach
remains the preferred solution to this problem.
CONCLUSION
The most compelling argument is that New York General
Municipal Law § 50-e does not mandate the naming of individual
municipal employees in a notice of claim. The reasoning for the
Tannenbaum approach originating from White is unpersuasive.
Looking at the text of § 50-e(2), listing individual names is absent
from the statute, which carries a presumption that the
legislature intended to exclude such language. Moreover, the
approach set forth in Goodwin is aligned with the purpose behind
notice of claim requirements. And various policy concerns and
practical implications render the Goodwin approach superior.
Finally, the proposed amendment, which attempts to compromise
the two approaches, does not efficiently or logically solve the
notice of claim issue.
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Given the financial liability stemming from municipal tort
lawsuits, as well as the consequences if plaintiffs fail to comply
with notice of claim requirements, New York and federal courts
should adopt the Goodwin approach moving forward. Thus, the
New York Court of Appeals should resolve the split of authority
in favor of the Second, Third, and Fourth Departments.

